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Bill of Rights
The Supreme Court
and the Bill of Rights
By Robert A. Sedler
he Bill of Rights,' as we know
it today, is largely the product
of constitutional interpreta-
tion by the Supreme Court.
This article will focus on how
the Supreme Court has interpreted the
Bill of Rights in performing its func-
tion as the "supreme expositor" of the
meaning of the Constitution.2
Lawyers tend to see the Bill of Rights
as a legal document, with provisions
that are designed to embody a distinct
legal meaning. The text of the Bill of
Rights, however, reads more like a
political document, an exhortation ad-
dressed to all the branches of the fed-
eral government-Congress, the Pres-
ident and the Judiciary-containing a
long list of "Thou Shall Nots." A num-
ber of these provisions are expressed
in majestic generalities, such as the
entire First Amendment, the Fourth
Amendments search and seizure provi-
sion, and the Fifth Amendments due
process clause. Others are broadly
phrased in various levels of generality,
while still others (such as the Fifth
Amendments requirement of grand
jury indictment) relate to preventing
certain abuses of the colonial era with
which the framers were familiar.
More significant perhaps than the
particular guarantees themselves is the
total effect of the Bill of Rights. The
Bill of Rights is sweeping in its pro-
hibitions, qualitatively and quantita-
tively, and the limitations it imposes
are extensive and overlapping. This
reflects the fact, in my view, that the
overriding principle in the structure of
constitutional governance established
by the Constitution is the principle
of limitation on governmental power
in order to protect individual rights.3
Lawyers tend to see
the Bill of Rights
as a legal document,
with provisions that are
designed to embody a
distinct legal meaning.
While the Constitution makes the leg-
islative and executive branches of the
federal government electorally account-
able, the framers refused to put their
faith in electoral accountability alone.
The framers were seriously concerned
about abuse of governmental power
even by a government that was elector-
ally accountable, and about the protec-
tion of individual rights from the ac-
tion of any government no matter how
democratic and electorally accountable
that government was. So, in the same
Constitution establishing representa-
tive democracy as the form of govern-
ment for this nation, the framers in-
cluded the Bill of Rights,4 and thereby
imposed a set of sweeping limitations
on governmental power in order to
protect individual rights.
t should also be remembered that
these sweeping limitations on gov-
ernmental power contained in the
Bill of Rights were not adopted on the
assumption that the federal judiciary
would define the meaning of these lim-
itations and would enforce them against
Congress and the President. It is not at
all clear that the framers contemplated
judicial review at the time of the prom-
ulgation of the Bill of Rights-Mar-
bury v Madison5 was more than a dec-
ade away-but even if they did, they
did not adopt the Bill of Rights to
enable the judiciary to check the ex-
ercise of power by the other branches.
Rather, the framers were trying to es-
tablish the principle that the power of
the government must be limited in
order to protect individual rights, and
they accomplished their goal by the
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promulgation of the limitations on gov-
ernmental power contained in the Bill
of Rights.
It is this overriding principle that
has been implemented by the Supreme
Court in its interpretation of the Bill
of Rights and the other provisions of
the Constitution protecting individual
rights.6 The Court has interpreted the
Bill of Rights expansively in order to
ensure that its provisions would be
fully operable as limitations on gov-
ernmental power in contemporary so-
ciety. In this regard, it is also signifi-
cant that our Constitution is one that
is "intended to endure.' 7 The framers
intended that the Bill of Rights operate
as a continuing limitation on govern-
mental power "for the ages to come,"
and the Court has interpreted the Bill
of Rights in such a way that it can be
relied upon to check new abuses of
governmental power as they appear in
contemporary society.
hat is clear above all else is that
the Court has rejected any no-
tion of "strict construction" or
"interpretivism" which would hold that,
in interpreting the Bill of Rights, the
Court cannot properly go beyond val-
ues that were purportedly "consti-
tutionalized" by the framers in the
sense that they are "fairly inferable
from the Constitution itself. 8 Under
this view, for example, the due process
clause would have only a "procedural"
component, and could not properly
be relied on to invalidate "substantive"
legislation.
The opposite view, popularly re-
ferred to as "liberal construction" or
"non-interpretivism," is that, in inter-
preting constitutional provisions pro-
tecting individual rights, the Court may
go beyond values purportedly consti-
tutionalized by the framers and may
rely on values that it has infused into
broadly-framed and open-ended con-
stitutional provisions, such as the due
process clause, as the basis for invali-
dating governmental action.9
As between these opposing view-
points,' 0 it is not disputed that the
Supreme Court regularly engages in
"non-interpretivist' review." Ever since
the late 19th century, for example, the
Court has seen the due process clause
as containing a "substantive" as well as
a "procedural" component. While the
Court initially used the due process
clause as the textual basis for protect-
ing "economic freedom" and invali-
dating economic regulation in the
"Lochner" era,' 2 a position that it later
repudiated, 3 it now uses the due proc-
ess clause as the textual basis for pro-
tecting "personal freedom" and invali-
dating laws interfering with "privacy"
interests, such as anti-abortion laws,' 4
and laws restricting marriage or family
living arrangements. 15
How the Court proceeds in
defining a particular
constitutional provision
depends, in no small part,
on the nature of the
provision itself.
More significantly, the Court's insti-
tutional behavior in interpreting the
Bill of Rights and the other individual
rights provisions of the Constitution
does not indicate that the Court recog-
nizes any distinction between so-called
"interpretivist' and "non-interpretivist'
judicial review. The Court views its
function in constitutional adjudication
as defining the meaning of the Consti-
tution and applying the provisions of
the Constitution, as they have been de-
fined by the Court, to the challenged
law or governmental action in ques-
tion. In performing that function the
Court does not distinguish between
different kinds of judicial review.
How the Court proceeds in defining
a particular constitutional provision
depends, in no small part, on the na-
ture of the provision itself. The mean-
ing of some provisions protecting in-
dividual rights, such as the ex post facto
and bill of attainder clauses,16 are clear
from the text and the historical circum-
stances surrounding their adoption,
because the language used in these
provisions had a well-defined mean-
ing at the time the Constitution was
adopted, and because these provisions
were directed toward particular abuses
of the Colonial era with which the
framers were familiar.17 These provi-
sions can readily be applied to a cur-
rent governmental practice by analo-
gizing that practice to the practices
with which the framers were familiar
and which they intended to prohibit by
the adoption of these provisions.
he major provisions of the Bill
of Rights, of course, are not nar-
row, and their meaning cannot
remotely be understood by reference to
the text alone or the historical circum-
stances surrounding their adoption. As
noted above, provisions such as the
First Amendment, the Fourth Amend-
ment's search and seizure clause, the
Fifth Amendments due process clause,
as well as the Fourteenth Amendment
are expressed as "majestic generalities.'
It is an important part of our constitu-
tional tradition that limitations on gov-
ernmental power designed to protect
individual rights are often broadly-
phrased and open-ended. Provisions
containing these kinds of limitations
require extensive definition by the
Court. In addition, some provisions
that are framed at a lower level of gen-
erality, such as the Sixth Amendments
guarantee of a speedy and public trial,
are sufficiently indeterminate that they
too require substantial definition by
the Court.18
In defining the meaning of the pro-
visions of the Bill of Rights, and in ap-
plying these provisions in particular
cases, the Court has been very eclectic.
The Court has not felt constrained to
search for values purportedly constitu-
tionalized by the framers, let alone to
ask whether the framers would have
considered a particular law or govern-
mental action to be prohibited by a
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particular constitutional provision. For
example, when interpreting the Four-
teenth Amendments guarantee of equal
protection of the laws in the context of
identifiable group discrimination, the
Court has focused on the provision's
"broad, organic purpose." 19 On that ba-
sis, it has held unconstitutional a state
law prohibiting interracial marriage,
something that the framers probably
did not perceive as being prohibited by
the equal protection clause when it
was promulgated. Likewise, the Court
has held that the equal protection clause
generally invalidates discrimination on
the basis of gender,20 an interpretation
that never would have been counte-
nanced by the framers.21
he Court has likewise interpreted
the First Amendments guarantee
of freedom of speech very broadly,
even to the point of protecting expres-
sion that takes the form of "commer-
cial speech" 22 and "entertainment."23
And it has interpreted the First Amend-
ment's free exercise clause as not only
protecting the profession of religious
beliefs, but in some circumstances pro-
tecting conduct based on religious be-
liefs from governmental interference24
or "burdens."25
On the other hand, in some in-
stances-even when dealing with
broadly-phrased and open-ended pro-
visions like the First Amendment-
the Court has resorted to a purely his-
torical interpretation, looking to the
specific intentions of the framers to
determine whether a constitutional
provision protected a particular activ-
ity26 or invalidated a particular gov-
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ernmental practice.27 The Court has
also looked to historical practice to
find that particular rights come within
the protection of a constitutional guar-
antee, such as the claimed First Amend-
ment right of the public to attend a
criminal trial.28
The eclecticism of the Supreme
Court's constitutional interpretation
demonstrates how the Court both per-
ceives and performs its function of
defining the meaning of the Constitu-
tion. It defines the meaning of each
constitutional provision and applies
that provision, as it has defined it, to
the determination of the constitutional
issue presented in the case before it.
Where the Court considers it to be ap-
propriate and necessary, it will make
value infusions into broadly-phrased
and open-ended provisions, and it will
make value judgments about the rela-
tive importance of conflicting individ-
ual and governmental interests in the
circumstances presented. And above
all, the Court has interpreted the pro-
visions of the Bill of Rights in such a
way as to make them fully operable as
a limitation on governmental power to
protect individual rights in contempo-
rary society.
At the same time, there are impor-
tant constraints on the Supreme Courts
interpretation of the guarantees of the
Bill of Rights. These constraints inhere
in the nature of the judicial process
and in the Court's concern that it per-
form its constitutional function in a
manner that will not diminish public
respect for, and acceptance of, that
function.
Constitutional interpretation, like
any other judicial decision-making,
operates within a recognized judicial
framework. In making constitutional
decisions, the Court must deal with
the facts of a particular case and with
its own precedents, which it must fol-
low, distinguish, or, in a very rare case,
overrule. The Court tries to set forth a
reasoned elaboration for the bases of
its decisions, and its decisions in one
case build on, and are related to, its
decisions in other cases. Constitutional
doctrine, then, like any other doctrine,
develops in a line of growth,29 and it is
the line of growth of the applicable
constitutional doctrine that provides
the parameters for the resolution of
the constitutional question at issue in
a particular case.
Second, as the Court performs its
function of constitutional interpreta-
tion, it realizes that it must not di-
lute the strength of the Bill of Rights
by too readily invalidating governmen-
tal action that does not interfere with
important individual rights. Since in-
validating governmental action on con-
stitutional grounds is a very serious
matter, the Court will always exercise
that power with restraint, recognizing
that the Constitution must not be triv-
ialized by its too casual invocation.
Likewise, the Court understands that
there are limits on how far it can go in
interpreting the Constitution so as to
restrict important policy choices made
by the electorally accountable branches
of the government. 30
It is these constraints on constitu-
tional interpretation that have enabled
the Court to provide a high degree of
protection for individual rights under
the Bill of Rights while at the same
time preserving the foundations of rep-
resentative democracy in this nation. N
Footnotes
1. The reference to the Bill of Rights is in-
tended to include the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. The due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment "incorporates" almost
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In making constitutional decisions, the Court
must deal with the facts of a particular case and
with its own precedents, which it must follow,
distinguish, or, in a very rare case, overrule.
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all of the guarantees of the Bill of Rights,
so as to make them operative and binding
on the states.
The Fourteenth Amendment's equal
protection clause has been the principal
constitutional basis for challenging dis-
crimination on the basis of identifiable
group membership, such as race, gender,
alienage and illegitimacy. Although the Bill
of Rights contains no equal protection
clause, the Fifth Amendments due process
clause has been interpreted as prohibiting
"unjustifiable discrimination" on the part
of the federal government, so that there is
in effect "Fifth Amendment equal protec-
tion." See e.g., Bolling v Sharpe, 347 U.S.
497 (1954) (unconstitutional racial dis-
crimination by the federal government in
the operation of racially segregated schools
in the District of Columbia). As a general
proposition, whatever is a denial of equal
protection on the part of the states is also
a violation of due process on the part of
the federal government, except where there
is a federal interest that can be relied on to
justify the disparate treatment and no cor-
responding state interest. This has ap-
peared primarily with respect to federal
laws discriminating against aliens, which
have been upheld on the basis of Congress'
plenary power over immigration and nat-
uralization. See e.g., Mathews v Diaz, 426
U.S. 67 (1976) (no due process violation
resulting from federal law denying Medi-
care benefits to aliens).
2. "In 1803, Marbury v Madison, declared the
basic principle that the federal judiciary is
supreme in the exposition of the law of the
Constitution, and that principle has ever
since been respected by this Court and the
Country as a permanent and indispensa-
ble feature of our constitutional system."
Cooper v Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).
3. I have discussed this matter at greater
length elsewhere. Sedler, "The Legitimacy
Debate in Constitutional Adjudication: An
Assessment and a Different Perspective,"
44 Ohio State L.J. 93, 123-26 (1983).
4. The Bill of Rights is properly considered a
part of the structure of constitutional gov-
ernance established by the original Consti-
tution, because it was promulgated "prac-
tically contemporaneous with the adoption
of the original Constitution." The Slaugh-
terhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 67
(1873).
5. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
6. Art. I secs. 9 and 10 include limitations on
federal and state power respectively that
are designed to protect individual rights,
such as a prohibition against ex post facto
laws and bills of attainder. Other provi-
sions protecting individual rights include
the Thirteenth, Fifteenth, Nineteenth,
Twenty-Fourth, and Twenty-Sixth Amend-
ments. The Court has also found individ-
ual rights in the internal inferences of the
Constitution, such as the right of inter-
state travel, which the Court has referred
to as a "basic generic right fundamental to
the concept of our Federal Union." United
States v Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966).
7. As Chief Justice Marshall observed long
ago, our Constitution is one that is "in-
tended to endure for ages to come, and
consequently to be adopted to the various
crises of human affairs." McCulloch v Mary-
land, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819).
8. Robert Bork states this position succinctly:
"Courts must accept any value choice the
Legislature makes unless it clearly runs
contrary to a choice made in the framing
of the Constitution." Bork, "Neutral Prin-
ciples and Some First Amendment Prob-
lems," 47 Ind. L.J. 1, 10-11 (1971). For a
more detailed exposition of this position,
see Grano, 'Judicial Review and a Written
Constitution in a Democratic Society" 28
Wayne L. Rev. 1 (1981).
9. Among the numerous expositions of the
non-interpretivist position are M. Perry,
The Constitution, the Courts and Human
Rights (1982); Brest, "The Misconceived
Quest for Original Understanding," 60 B.U.
L. Rev. 204 (1980).
10. For a further discussion of these opposing
views of "proper" constitutional interpreta-
tion, see Sedler, "The Enduring Constitu-
tion of the People and the Protection of
Individual Rights," 66 Mich. BJ. 1108, 1110
(1987).
11. See the discussion of this point in Sedler,
"The Legitimacy Debate," supra, note 3 at
109-10.
12. The "Lochner era" takes its name from
Lochner v New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905),
where the Court invalidated a state law
limiting the hours of employment. Al-
though Lochner itself was overruled sub
silentio a few years later in Bunting v
Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917), during this
time the Court invalidated on due process
grounds a good deal of economic regula-
tion, such as laws designed to protect
union membership, see e.g., Adair v United
States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908), and minimum
wage laws. See e.g., Adkins v Children's Hos-
pital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
13. Beginning with Nebbia v New York, 291 U.S.
502 (1934). In the years following Nebbia,
the Court took an approach of complete
"judicial abstention" to due process chal-
lenges to economic regulation, overruling
as necessary the "Lochner" era cases to the
contrary. See e.g., Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v
Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952); Ferguson v
Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1953).
14. Roe v Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
15. See e.g., Zablocki v Redhail, 434 U.S. 374
(1978) (law prohibiting remarriage by
non-custodial parent under a duty of sup-
port unless parent proved current com-
pliance with support obligation and that
children would not be likely to become
"public charge"); Moore v East Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494 (1977) (zoning law defin-
ing "family" in such a way that precluded
grandmother from living with her grand-
children, who were cousins rather than
siblings).
16. U.S. Const., Art I, secs. 9 and 10.
17. The ex post facto clause only applies to
laws that impose a punitive sanction for
past conduct that was lawful when per-
formed. See e.g., Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S.
(4 Wall.) 333 (1866). If the law does not
impose a punitive sanction for past con-
duct, it does not violate the ex post facto
clause, although past conduct is the basis
for the laws application. See e.g., Hawker
v New York, 170 U.S. 189 (1898).
The bill of attainder clause is directed at
the prevention of "legislative punishment,
the focus of the constitutional analysis is
on whether the challenged law in fact
amounts to a 'legislative punishment."' See
e.g., United States v Brown, 381 U.S. 437
(1965); United States v Lovett, 328 U.S. 303
(1946).
18. See e.g., Gannett Co. v DePasquale, 443 U.S.
368 (1979); Barker v Wingo, 407 U.S. 514
(1972).
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19. Loving v Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
20. Beginning with Reed v Reed, 404 U.S. 71
(1971).
21. The historical understanding of the inap-
plicability of the equal protection clause to
claims of gender discrimination is illus-
trated by Bradwell v Illinois, 83 U.S. 130
(1873), where the Court upheld a law de-
nying women the right to practice law, and
Justice Bradley explained that: "[t[he nat-
ural and proper timidity and delicacy
which belongs to the female sex evidently
unfits it for many of the occupations of
civil life. [The] paramount destiny and
mission of woman are to fulfill the noble
and benign offices of wife and mother.
This is the law of the Creator.'
22. See Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v Vir-
ginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748 (1976).
23. See Schad v Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61
(1981).
24. See e.g., Wisconsin v Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972) (state cannot, consistent with the
free exercise clause, require Amish chil-
dren to attend school beyond the eighth
grade).
25. See e.g., Sherbert v Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963) (state cannot, consistent with free
exercise clause, deny unemployment bene-
fit to sabbatarian who refuses to accept
Saturday work).
26. In Roth v United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483
(1957), the Court held that "obscene
speech" was not within the protection of
the First Amendment on the ground that
there was "sufficient contemporaneous evi-
dence to show that [at the time of the
adoption of the First Amendment] obscen-
ity... was outside the protection intended
for speech and press."
27. In Marsh v Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983),
the Court held that "legislative prayer," did
not violate the First Amendment's Estab-
lishment Clause on the ground that the
framers specifically intended to allow "leg-
islative prayer," as evidenced by the fact
that when Congress promulgated the Bill
of Rights, it was following the practice of
employing a chaplain and opening its ses-
sions with prayer.
28. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v Virginia,
448 U.S. 555 (1980).
29. As Professor Sandalow has observed: "The
meaning that we give to them [constitu-
tional provisions] ... must take account of
the 'line of their growth' ... The meaning
of a constitutional provision develops in-
crementally, and that provision's line of
growth strongly influences its application
in particular cases." Sandalow, "Consti-
tutional Interpretation," 79 Mich. L. Rev.
1033, 1054 (1981).
30. This matter is discussed in more detail
in Sedler, "The Legitimacy Debate in Con-
stitutional Adjudication," supra, note 3 at
119-120.
ARAB-AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION
The AABA (Arab-American Bar Association) meets regularly and
presents guest speakers to comment on various current issues. If
you would like to develop friendships with attorneys of similar in-
terests and receive future meeting notices, please complete the
bottom portion of this notice and return to:
Mona Majzoub
1 Woodward Avenue
10th Floor
Detroit, Michigan 48226
Name:
Bar No.:
Address:
IfOQ 
• ,, .......... .........
MICHIGAN BAR IOURNAL C)"Tr RPIP 1001
